This article is a part of our Vulnerability Database (back to index)
Cross-site Scripting occurrences in Gogs
In Gogs, versions v0.6.5 through v0.12.10 are vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) that leads to an account takeover. (2022-10-11, CVE-2022-32174)
Gogs is an open source self-hosted Git service. In versions of gogs prior to 0.12.9 `DisplayName` does not filter characters input from users, which leads to an XSS vulnerability when directly displayed in the issue list. This issue has been resolved in commit 155cae1d which sanitizes `DisplayName` prior to display to the user. All users of gogs are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should check their users' display names for malicious characters. (2022-06-09, CVE-2022-31038)
Stored xss bug in GitHub repository gogs/gogs prior to 0.12.7. As the repo is public , any user can view the report and when open the attachment then xss is executed. This bug allow executed any javascript code in victim account . (2022-05-05, CVE-2022-1464)
In Gogs 0.11.53, an attacker can use a crafted .eml file to trigger MIME type sniffing, which leads to XSS, as demonstrated by Internet Explorer, because an "X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff" header is not sent. (2018-09-14, CVE-2018-17031)
Why Cross-site Scripting can be dangerous
Cross site scripting is an attack where a web page executes code that is injected by an adversary. It usually appears, when users input is presented. This attack can be used to impersonate a user, take over control of the session, or even steal API keys.
The attack can be executed e.g. when you application injects the request parameter directly into the HTML code of the page returned to the user:
https://server.com/confirmation?message=Transaction+Complete
what results in:
<span>Confirmation: Transaction Complete</span>
In that case the message can be modified to become a valid Javascript code, e.g.:
https://server.com/confirmation?message=<script>dangerous javascript code here</script>
and it will be executed locally by the user's browser with full access to the user's personal application/browser data:
<span>Confirmation: <script>dangerous javascript code here</script></span>