This article is a part of our Vulnerability Database (back to index)
Cross-site Scripting occurrences in Openwrt
OpenWrt 21.02.1 allows XSS via the NAT Rules Name screen. (2021-12-27, CVE-2021-45906)
OpenWrt 21.02.1 allows XSS via the Port Forwards Add Name screen. (2021-12-27, CVE-2021-45904)
OpenWrt 21.02.1 allows XSS via the Traffic Rules Name screen. (2021-12-27, CVE-2021-45905)
There is missing input validation of host names displayed in OpenWrt before 19.07.8. The Connection Status page of the luci web-interface allows XSS, which can be used to gain full control over the affected system via ICMP. (2021-08-02, CVE-2021-32019)
A stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability was discovered in the Web Interface for OpenWRT LuCI version 19.07 which allows attackers to inject arbitrary Javascript in the OpenWRT Hostname via the Hostname Change operation. (2021-05-25, CVE-2021-33425)
LuCI in OpenWrt 18.06.0 through 18.06.4 allows stored XSS via a crafted SSID. (2021-01-26, CVE-2019-25015)
OpenWrt 18.06.4 allows XSS via the "New port forward" Name field to the cgi-bin/luci/admin/network/firewall/forwards URI (this can occur, for example, on a TP-Link Archer C7 device). (2019-12-03, CVE-2019-18993)
OpenWrt 18.06.4 allows XSS via these Name fields to the cgi-bin/luci/admin/network/firewall/rules URI: "Open ports on router" and "New forward rule" and "New Source NAT" (this can occur, for example, on a TP-Link Archer C7 device). (2019-12-03, CVE-2019-18992)
cgi_handle_request in uhttpd in OpenWrt through 18.06.1 and LEDE through 17.01 has unauthenticated reflected XSS via the URI, as demonstrated by a cgi-bin/?[XSS] URI. (2018-11-28, CVE-2018-19630)
Why Cross-site Scripting can be dangerous
Cross site scripting is an attack where a web page executes code that is injected by an adversary. It usually appears, when users input is presented. This attack can be used to impersonate a user, take over control of the session, or even steal API keys.
The attack can be executed e.g. when you application injects the request parameter directly into the HTML code of the page returned to the user:
https://server.com/confirmation?message=Transaction+Complete
what results in:
<span>Confirmation: Transaction Complete</span>
In that case the message can be modified to become a valid Javascript code, e.g.:
https://server.com/confirmation?message=<script>dangerous javascript code here</script>
and it will be executed locally by the user's browser with full access to the user's personal application/browser data:
<span>Confirmation: <script>dangerous javascript code here</script></span>