Orange-form Cross-Site Request Forgery

In the Orange Form WordPress plugin through 1.0, the process_bulk_action() function in "admin/orange-form-email.php" performs an unprepared SQL query with an unsanitized parameter ($id). Only admin can access the page that invokes the function, but because of lack of CSRF protection, it is actually exploitable and could allow attackers to make a logged in admin delete arbitrary posts for example (2022-02-28, CVE-2021-24704)

The Orange Form WordPress plugin through 1.0.1 does not have any authorisation and CSRF checks in all of its AJAX calls, for example the or_delete_filed one which is available to both unauthenticated and authenticated users could allow attackers to delete arbitrary posts.The AJAX calls performing actions on posts also do not ensure that the post belong to them (or that they are allowed to perform such action on it) (2022-02-28, CVE-2021-24688)

The absence of Anti-CSRF tokens may lead to a Cross-Site Request Forgery attack that can result in executing a specific application action as another logged in user, e.g. steal their account by changing their email and password or silently adding a new admin user account when executed from the administrator account.

The attacker may copy one of your web application forms, e.g. email/password change form.

The webpage will contain a form with the exact set of fields as the original application but with input values already provided and the submit button replaced with a Javascript code causing auto-submission. When the page is accessed the form will be immediately submitted and page contents replaced with a valid content or a redirect to your original application.

One of your application users who is already logged in can be then tricked to navigate to such malicious page e.g. by clicking a link in a phishing email, and the pre-populated form content will be submitted to your application like it would be submitted by your user.