This article is a part of our Vulnerability Database (back to index)
Cross-site Scripting occurrences in Snapcenter
Highcharts JS is a JavaScript charting library based on SVG. In Highcharts versions 8 and earlier, the chart options structure was not systematically filtered for XSS vectors. The potential impact was that content from untrusted sources could execute code in the end user's browser. The vulnerability is patched in version 9. As a workaround, implementers who are not able to upgrade may apply DOMPurify recursively to the options structure to filter out malicious markup. (2021-05-05, CVE-2021-29489)
An XSS vulnerability was discovered in python-lxml's clean module versions before 4.6.3. When disabling the safe_attrs_only and forms arguments, the Cleaner class does not remove the formaction attribute allowing for JS to bypass the sanitizer. A remote attacker could exploit this flaw to run arbitrary JS code on users who interact with incorrectly sanitized HTML. This issue is patched in lxml 4.6.3. (2021-03-21, CVE-2021-28957)
A XSS vulnerability was discovered in python-lxml's clean module. The module's parser didn't properly imitate browsers, which caused different behaviors between the sanitizer and the user's page. A remote attacker could exploit this flaw to run arbitrary HTML/JS code. (2020-12-03, CVE-2020-27783)
In jQuery versions greater than or equal to 1.2 and before 3.5.0, passing HTML from untrusted sources - even after sanitizing it - to one of jQuery's DOM manipulation methods (i.e. .html(), .append(), and others) may execute untrusted code. This problem is patched in jQuery 3.5.0. (2020-04-29, CVE-2020-11022)
Why Cross-site Scripting can be dangerous
Cross site scripting is an attack where a web page executes code that is injected by an adversary. It usually appears, when users input is presented. This attack can be used to impersonate a user, take over control of the session, or even steal API keys.
The attack can be executed e.g. when you application injects the request parameter directly into the HTML code of the page returned to the user:
https://server.com/confirmation?message=Transaction+Complete
what results in:
<span>Confirmation: Transaction Complete</span>
In that case the message can be modified to become a valid Javascript code, e.g.:
https://server.com/confirmation?message=<script>dangerous javascript code here</script>
and it will be executed locally by the user's browser with full access to the user's personal application/browser data:
<span>Confirmation: <script>dangerous javascript code here</script></span>