This article is a part of our Vulnerability Database (back to index)
Cross-site Scripting occurrences in Tutor Lms
The Tutor LMS WordPress plugin before 2.0.10 does not escape some course parameters, which could allow high privilege users such as admin to perform Stored Cross-Site Scripting attacks even when the unfiltered_html capability is disallowed (for example in multisite setup) (2022-10-17, CVE-2022-2563)
The Tutor LMS WordPress plugin before 1.9.12 does not escape the search parameter before outputting it back in an attribute in an admin page, leading to a Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (2022-01-24, CVE-2021-25017)
The Tutor LMS WordPress plugin before 1.9.11 does not sanitise and escape user input before outputting back in attributes in the Student Registration page, leading to a Reflected Cross-Site Scripting issue (2021-11-23, CVE-2021-24873)
The Tutor LMS WordPress plugin before 1.9.9 does not escape some of its settings before outputting them in attributes, which could allow high privilege users to perform Cross-Site Scripting attacks even when the unfiltered_html capability is disallowed. (2021-10-18, CVE-2021-24740)
The Tutor LMS – eLearning and online course solution WordPress plugin before 1.9.2 did not escape the Summary field of Announcements (when outputting it in an attribute), which can be created by users as low as Tutor Instructor. This lead to a Stored Cross-Site Scripting issue, which is triggered when viewing the Announcements list, and could result in privilege escalation when viewed by an admin. (2021-08-02, CVE-2021-24455)
Why Cross-site Scripting can be dangerous
Cross site scripting is an attack where a web page executes code that is injected by an adversary. It usually appears, when users input is presented. This attack can be used to impersonate a user, take over control of the session, or even steal API keys.
The attack can be executed e.g. when you application injects the request parameter directly into the HTML code of the page returned to the user:
https://server.com/confirmation?message=Transaction+Complete
what results in:
<span>Confirmation: Transaction Complete</span>
In that case the message can be modified to become a valid Javascript code, e.g.:
https://server.com/confirmation?message=<script>dangerous javascript code here</script>
and it will be executed locally by the user's browser with full access to the user's personal application/browser data:
<span>Confirmation: <script>dangerous javascript code here</script></span>